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Abstract 
This paper addresses the problem of public administration politicization 
in Romania between 1990 and 2012. The approach taken here is that of 
Europeanization by conditionality and social learning, and of reform 
reversal hypothesis where the social learning is absent. This theoretical 
framework consists, briefly stated, in the belief that the adhering CEE 
(Central and Eastern European) states are subjected to a” sticks and 
carrots” mechanism and they respond to it by a (usually high enough) 
degree of compliance with the EU (European Union) norm. From this, 
once this mechanism gone (when EU membership is granted) if the 
social learning was unsuccessful, it is to be expected to observe a 
regress of reform or a reform reversal. I discuss this reform reversal 
hypothesis for the Romanian case. The paper is organized as follows: 
first, I briefly deal with the problem of Europeanization; second, I discuss 
the problem of the general class of international compliance theories and 
I analyze the specific case of compliance by Europeanization; third, I 
discuss the problem of conditionality and conditional regress hypothesis; 
fourth, I deal with a specific case of European compliance, the problem 
of civil service’s neutrality in CEE states before and after EU accession; 
fifth, I address the problem of Romanian public administration reform as 
a case of reform reversal. The argument I employ here is that the 
Romania experienced a reversal of reform after joining the EU and that 
might suggest a poor level of social learning in the case of de-
politicization. 
 
Keywords: politicization, public administration, Europeanization, 
conditionality, reform regress. 
 
Europeanization  
After the fall of the communist regimes, CEE countries experienced a 
process of democratization which along the way transformed itself in a 
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process of democratization by Europeanization. As a result of becoming 
Member States of the EU, Europeanization was amongst the main 
factors of democratic consolidation. A few definitions of Europeanization 
are needed here. Ladrech (1994), for instance, defined Europeanization 
as ”an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics 
to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of 
the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech, 
1994, p.69). Börzel (1999) offered a similar definition: ”Europeanization 
is a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly 
subject to European policy-making.” (Börzel, 1999, p.574). Olsen (2002, 
pp.923-924) described Europeanization as: a) a change in external 
boundaries, b) developing institution at the European level, c) central 
penetration of national systems of governance, d) exporting forms of 
political organization, e) a political unification project. These are only a 
few of the large amount of definitions which Europeanization received in 
the literature. Drawing partly from them, I will use Europeanization so as 
to label the incremental process of import-export of norms and practices 
between EU and candidate countries (and potentially between candidate 
countries themselves) with a focus on the exporting process from EU to 
the candidate states – therefore a process in which EU mainly exports 
norms and candidate states (mainly) comply with them. This brings 
forward the problem of compliance.  
 
The problem of international compliance 
Why comply? The process of compliance of an actor to an external rule 
or norm was studied in various ways. Checkel (2001) identified two main 
strategies of assessing the compliance of national actors to international 
norms: a rationalist one which emphasized “cost-benefit calculations and 
material incentives”
2 (Checkel, 2001, p.553) and a constructivist one 
which emphasized “social learning, socialization and social norms” 
(Checkel, 2001, p.553).
  The rationalistic approach is in fact the old 
rational choice approach to politics applied this time to international 
compliance. Checkel (2001) described it as a “neo-utilitarian, 
contractualist, and interest-based approach” (Checkel, 2001, p.556). So 
its tenets are based on methodological individualism, the utility 
maximizing paradigm, (mainly) the homo economicus principle and on 
preferences treated as exogenous (for this qualification see for example 
March, Olsen, 1984, p.737). In this approach rational actors behave 
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instrumentally and the compliance is stated only in cost-benefit terms. In 
other words, an agent will comply with the norm of an external agent if 
that is the lowest opportunity cost available action. On the other part, 
constructivists, as Checkel (2001) noted, traditionally focused not on the 
“why`s” of the compliance but rather on its later stage where norm 
internalization would be almost complete. “The result was a somewhat 
static portrayal of social interaction” (Checkel, 2001, p.557). The new 
constructivists though, focused on the dynamics of compliance and 
identified “two causal mechanisms through which social actors comply 
with norms: social protest/mobilization and social learning” (Checkel, 
2001, p.557). This approach could be described as institutional or in its 
extreme version, methodologically holistic and preferences would be 
taken usually as endogenous – they are nested by social and formal 
institutions (March, Olsen, 1984, p.739). So what one has here is a 
picture of two apparently methodologically incompatible views of social 
research and scientific explanation
3 both carrying a claim of universality. 
This claim was challenged amongst others, by Checkel (2001), Kelley 
(2004) or Schimmelfenning (2005). They all talked about a third (hybrid) 
alternative, but only Checkel assumed it explicitly. “For elites […] norms 
are not internalized, they merely constrain behavior. Rationalist models 
easily explain elites’ compliance […] Deriving systematic explanations 
for compliance at the grass-roots, activist, and NGO-levels is more 
problematic. In some cases, norms genuinely constitute agents in the 
sense meant by constructivists, providing them with new understandings 
of interest/identity.” (Checkel, 2001, p.558) From this, one needs both 
“eye glasses” to view the entire social phenomena.  
 
Conditionality and the conditional regress hypothesis
4 
Building on the above argument and turning back to the initial problem, 
compliance to the European norm, this paper`s argument is fourfold 
(Table 1).  
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Table 1: Patterns of Europeanization 
 
Social learning   
Conditionality  Effective Ineffective 
Present  Type 1: High level of 
compliance, Fair 
changes 
Type 2: Fair level of 
compliance, Pretense 
changes 
Absent  Type 3: Fair level of 
compliance, 
Internalized changes 
Type 4: Low level of 
compliance, Reversed 
changes 
 
(Source: Ungureanu and Iancu, 2013)  
 
First, if social learning is effective at the grass-roots level, and an 
external mechanism of sticks and carrots is in action, they will both act 
as external constraints on political elites
5 and one should observe a 
compliance of national actors to the European norm. Second, if social 
learning is ineffective but external conditionality is present, one should 
expect an effective compliance to the external norm. Third, if the 
external conditionality is absent (or almost absent) and social learning is 
ineffective then one should observe a lack of compliance to the 
European norm. And finally, if the external conditional is absent, but 
social learning is effective, then one could observe compliance to the 
European norm.  
 
Putting this to work for the Europeanization of CEE states, the problem 
could be reformulated in terms of ”before accession” and ”after 
accession”. Before accession the CEE states complied with the 
European norm. This is a fact acknowledged by almost any scholar of 
Europeanization and it is backed up by EU Regular Reports and the final 
stage of the accession process - the EU membership. After the 
accession, though, the conditionality
6 mechanism of the EU is no longer 
in place (at least not for most of the CEE countries
7). Compliance by 
rewards and sanctions is not available anymore. Starting from this 
factual observation, the rationalistic Europeanization literature argued 
                                                 
5 The hidden assumption here is the classic rationalistic (public choice) assumption that 
politicians seek re-election and they will be sensible to the median voter’s ideal point. 
Here, internalization by social learning changes the position of the median voter and a 
change in policy position it is expected to occur.  
6 By european conditionality I mean a system of positive and/or negative stimuli used as 
a central strategy by the EU to induce non-member state harmonization with its own 
standards. This definition draws from Kelley (2004, p. 428) and Schimmelfennig, Engert 
and Knobel (2003, p. 495). 
7 Romanian and Bulgaria remained under scrutiny due to the Cooperation and 
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that one should observe a reform regress or a reform reversal from the 
part of the new Member States. This is the regress hypothesis or reform 
reversal hypothesis. This hypothesis was formulated, amongst other, by 
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2004), Schimmelfenning (2005, 
2008), Epstein and Sedelmeier (2008), Meyer-Sahling (2009), (2011), 
Pridham (2008), Iancu and Ungureanu (2010).  
 
At the beginning of this section I briefly stated a fourfold argument about 
the effectiveness of European compliance. As it can be seen, this 
argument belongs to the class of regress hypothesis theories but it is a 
special case of this class. It states the regress hypothesis conditional. 
Applied to CEE compliance after accession, the hypothesis should have 
the following form: Once EU conditionality is gone, the compliance of 
CEE states to EU norm should regress if social learning was ineffective. 
In other words: compliance to EU norms was costly to the national CEE 
elites. Once gone, if there is no domestic (popular) pressure to maintain 
it, they will change the rules and one will witness a reform reversal. This 
argument is useful for a large class of phenomena and its domain is 
large enough to explain almost any aspects of reform and de-form in 
CEE states. I will, though, use it here only for the case of Romanian 
public administration reform and de-form or reform reversal for the 
politicization dimension. 
 
Civil service politicization and reform reversal 
The Wilsonian – Weberian tradition favors the civil service as the most 
advanced form of public administration. In other words, bureaucratic 
production is considered to be superior to its counterparts. Wilson (1892) 
and Weber (1922) argued that bureaucracy has (unlike other forms as 
spoils system or the older system of class and privilege) two of the most 
important characteristics: it is neutral or impartial and it is efficient or 
effective. In this paper I am interested only in the problem of neutrality
8. 
The systematic study of neutrality of modern public administration began 
rather recently. Starting with the nineties though more scholars 
manifested scientific interest in it. Rauch (1995), Rauch, Evans (1999), 
(2000), Goetz, Margetts (1999), Goetz, Wollmann (2001), Meyer-Sahling 
(2001), (2004), (2008), (2009), Peters, Pierre (2004), Gajduschek 
(2007), Eichbaum, Shaw (2008) are some examples of this kind of 
studies. These authors are mostly focused on the ways in which CEE 
countries imported formally and behaviorally the bureaucratic EU norm. 
Explicitly stated, non-neutrality or politicization on the public 
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administration was the status quo of these states. By conditionality, EU 
guided these states through a long, difficult and sometimes not fully 
successful process towards an impartial public administration. Quoting 
Nunberg (1999), Meyer-Sahling (2004) argued that “more than one 
decade after the change of regime, the record of civil service reform in 
post-communist Europe suggests that civil service developments are 
characterized by reform delays, failures to implement legislation and the 
continuing politicization of personnel policy processes” (Nunberg in 
Meyer-Sahling, 2004, p.72). Further, Meyer-Sahling describes this 
situation arguing that Poland, Lithuania and Latvia adopted civil service 
laws but they were ineffective in implementing it. This failure was patch 
by revised laws in 1998, 1999 and 2000. Estonia adopted such a law in 
1995, Bulgaria and Romania in 1999, Slovakia in 2001 and Czech 
Republic in 2002 (another failure case because the 2002 law was never 
implemented). The only CEE country which is an exception from the 
slow progress rule is Hungary which adopted a civil service law in 1990 
and 1992 and which deepened its reforms by 1997, 2001 and 2002 
laws. (Meyer-Sahling, 2004). The Nunberg-Meyer-Sahling argument has 
at least two important implications: first, the existence of a zero point – 
an over-politicized communist type public administration (Goetz, 
Wollman, 2001, p.864) is presumed. Second, the process of de-
politicization actually took place. It was slow but it existed. Absent (or not 
strong enough) were, however, - as Meyer Sahling (2009), (2011)   
argues - the mechanisms to ensure the durability of these reforms. “EU 
failed to address the issue of post-accession durability, as it devised 
virtually no instruments to prevent post-accession reform backsliding in 
the area of civil service governance.” (Meyer-Sahling, 2011, p.235). 
Indeed, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia are, as Meyer-
Sahling (2011) shows, cases of reform reversal after accession. In the 
Baltic countries case the regress hypothesis is not confirmed and for the 
Hungarian case the evidences are not conclusive. (Meyer-Sahling, 2011, 
p.251). 
 
The underling theory here is that politicians or political elites are 
interested in having a power instrument as bureaucracy in their grasp. 
As a result of external pressure (EU conditionality) they slowly reform 
the public administration. Since after accession the compliance external 
incentives are gone, one should expect that the CEE political elite seek 
to reinstate the politicized status quo. Of course, this explanation is not 
valid for the Baltic states cases and therefore one should add either the 
possibility of a methodological failure from Meyer-Sahling (2011) or a 
case of successful social learning. Since I think that the methodological 
problem is rather improbable, the latter case seem to be more 
appropriate. So I should rewrite the regress hypothesis in the case of Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1 
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public administration politicization as the absence of both terms. In other 
terms, it is not the case of a true disjunction of the conditionality term 
and the social learning term or of a conjunction of both.  
 
This theory and its fully rationalistic cousin (the unconditional regress 
hypothesis) have, of course, to be tested. In this respect, Rauch and 
Evans (1999) used a Webberianess Scale Rauc and Evans, 1999, 
p.749) to assess the degree in which central agencies are characterized 
by meritocratic recruitment and the degree in which they provide a 
predictable long term career for civil servants. Gajduschek (2007) 
addressed the Hungarian case using an imaginary merit-patronage 
scale, while Eichbaum and Shaw (2008) used a similar index of 
”administrative politicization” (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2008, p.337). The 
politicization literature is scarce for the Bulgarian and the Romanian 
cases (Iancu and Ungureanu 2010 and 2011; Andrei et al., 2012). From 
this point of view, it could be said that both Romania and Bulgaria fall 
under the shadowy part of EU, one to be partly (only on the Romanian 
case) dealt with in the following section. 
 
Politicization in the hidden part of EU: The Romanian case 
For some time now, reform and democratization in CEE countries have 
triggered the interest of many public administration scholars (Klimovsky, 
2013; Iancu, 2013b; Pinterič and Prijon, 2013). Romania, with its 
institutional changes targeted to satisfying the public interest and the EU 
membership criteria was no different. Several national researches 
focused on reform patterns and actors involved in democratizing central 
and local public administration. Politicization emerged as a subject per 
se, and arguments were raised on whether the country was still (really) a 
viable and stable democracy. In fact, by July 2012, the Commission 
Report on the progress of Romania under CVM its serious concerns on 
the democratic status of the country: “Political challenges to judicial 
decisions, the undermining of the constitutional court, the overturning of 
established procedures and the removal of key checks and balances 
have called into question the Government's commitment to respect the 
rule of law and independent judicial review” (p. 3). And although by 
December 2012, Romania formally assured the European leaders of its 
commitment to democracy (in an “agreement of inter-institutional 
collaboration” signed by the Romanian President T. Basescu and Prime 
Minister V. Ponta), eyebrows still raise on account of politicization.  
 
A recent study relevant to civil service and thus to the scope of this 
article, is the one written by Andrei et al. (2012). Their general argument 
was that civil servants were highly vulnerable to legislative changes, as 
top politicians usually altered the rules of recruitment so as to better fit Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1 
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their appointees into management positions (Andrei et al. 2012, p.7). 
Following a survey conducted on 550 employees from public 
administration, the authors operationalize politicization as: changes in 
top management and executive positions based on political reasons and 
membership of public administrators in political parties. As results are 
presented, one reads that abruptly 36% of the respondents opted for a “I 
do not know” answer when asked “Were there any changes in personnel 
based on political criteria in your institution during the last year?”. Such a 
behavior, as argued by Andrei at al. (2012, p.10), could be seen as fear 
for acknowledging the politicization of the system. Furthermore, 
regarding the political membership variable, 57.1% of the top 
management civil servants working for the central administration and 
42.9% of those employed by local administrations declared their political 
affiliation to a party (Andrei et al., 2012, p.12). That led the authors into 
concluding that between 2007 and 2010 the neutrality of civil service in 
Romania could be questioned (Andrei at al., 2012, p.19). 
 
 
In the same vein, but arguing on the dead letters
9 of the civil servants’ 
code of conduct in Romania stands the work of Bryane (2012). As his 
argument unfolds, he comes to the very interesting conclusion that “no 
sane civil servant in Estonia, Romania or another Central European 
country would reasonably disobey their bosses’ orders because they 
believe their own decisions would better serve the public interest or the 
economise on government resources. No sane civil servant would rely 
on an administrative court, tribunal or arbiter to rule in their favour in 
such a circumstance. As civil servants can not rely on these codes of 
conduct in their daily work, they fail to provide substantive rights for 
these civil servants” (Bryane, 2012, p.297). Giving that the Romanian 
Code of Conduct (Law 7/2004 with amendments) speaks quite clearly of 
impartiality and political independence (article 3), Bryane’s work (2012) 
provides an excellent opportunity for consolidating the view that 
Romanian civil servants as well as politicians exhibit an instrumental 
behavior: the first do not attempt to disobey their political leaders, and 
the latter dissimulate political impartiality for the eyes of monitoring 
agents, while altering the rules according to their discretionary agendas.  
 
Nuţu and Ioniţă (2012) provide, at their turn, another proof for the 
existence of a deeply politicized administration in Romania. Their 
“clientelism index”, built on the frequency of discretionary transfers from 
                                                 
9 See Falkner and Treib (2008). They argue that the new member (and two other old 
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dead letters” (Falkner, Treib, 2008, p.293).  This label refers to the inconsistent behavior 
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central budget to local administrations serving the ruling party shows a 
peek between 2007 and 2008. Amounting to almost 80% of the total own 
revenues of local governments in 2008, such transfers were made 
based on power affiliation “with a twist” – money were targeted not only 
to mayors of the political color of the ruling coalition, but also to the 
independent officials (who usually denounced the opposition parties and 
became independent after election) (Ioniţă, 2012). Giving that according 
to the law, mayors are actively involved in recruiting civil servants, one 
could infer at this point that politicization of the recruitment system might 
be worth testing.  
 
On this issue, Ungureanu (2012) and Iancu and Ungureanu (2010) and 
(2011) built a quite comprehensive outlook of the bureaucracy and civil 
service reform in Romania. In fact, Iancu and Ungureanu (2010) and 
(2011) suggest that the European Union played an important role in 
adjusting the instrumental behavior of politicians and hence, directed the 
reform so as to better accommodate the accession expectations. Such 
an argument, supported by an overview of the civil service act, 
amendments and reform strategies adopted between 1999 and 2010, 
present a pattern of reform in two stages.  
 
The first one seemed obvious during the negotiation trials (1999-2006): 
Romania was a candidate (adhering) country, interested in playing by 
the rules (as set by the European Councils of Copenhagen and Madrid) 
and following to the letter the recommendations provided by the 
European monitoring agents. The analysis of the Regular and Monitoring 
Reports the European Commission issued for Romania (and the rest of 
the CEE region, for that matter) between 1998 and 2006 offered a 
comprehensive ‘to do list’ for civil service reform. In a non-exhaustive 
manner, Romania was kindly advised to adopt a civil service act, draft a 
code of conduct, improve the transparency of the recruitment 
procedures, adjust its institutional mechanisms for better fighting against 
corruption, and improve the overall efficiency of the public system. And if 
one follows the legislative innovations of the time, one may find that 
Romania adopted a Civil Service Act by 1999 (and amended it no less 
than 38 times up to present and 24 times between 1999 and 2006), 
created a National Agency for Civil Servants in 1999 (and by 2006 it 
reinforced its objectives and mission), allowed free access to public 
information by 2001, designed a Reform Strategy for Public 
Administration and e-Government by 2001 and one targeted at fighting 
against corruption by 2002, and elaborated a Code of Conduct for Civil 
servants by 2004.  
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The second stage was evident between 2007 and 2010. Iancu and 
Ungureanu (2010), (2011) argued that some of the provisions regarding 
the meritocratic civil service recruitment and mobility were changed thus 
allowing politicians to discretionary allocate offices within public 
administration. They especially referred to the 2009 changes in the Act 
of civil servants, when the list of eligibility criteria for high rank civil 
servants (top management positions) was amended so as: to allow the 
equivalence between graduating a training program and exercising a full 
Parliamentary mandate; to acknowledge the mayor’s power to recruit 
his/her own civil servants locally; and to approve the situations when, 
upon request, top management civil servants would suspend their public 
office so as to exercise a parliamentary mandate.  
 
The studies presented so far roughly argued in favor of the very same 
conclusion: politicization is present in the Romanian civil service, and the 
law and regulations allow it. Under-regulating the recruitment and 
mobility of civil servants, the competencies of the National Agency for 
Civil Servants or the methodology for allocating financial resources gives 
room to discretionary powers. How do these powers manifest in the case 
of civil service reform, or most specifically in that of recruiting personnel 
in Romania?  Did EU made any difference? 
 
With EU conditionality present, but not yet a clear vision on the 
effectiveness of social learning, two reform patterns seem to be under 
investigation: 
 
1. Conditional reforming - seems to have happened between 1999 and 
2006. Romania was officially a candidate country to the EU and the 
conditionality mechanisms were very much present. It was during that 
time that almost all regulations on meritocratic recruitment of personnel 
were enacted. As Iancu and Ungureanu (2010), (2011) presented it, the 
Act on civil service (1999) spoke of merit base selection, stability and a 
civil service free of political pressure. It also proclaimed the obligation of 
all civil servants to restrain themselves from expressing their political 
beliefs while on duty and announced free public competitions to be 
monitored by a National Agency for Civil Servants. The Act failed yet to 
include any pieces of information on how recruitment committees were 
to be formed or how the competition was to be organized. Such a 
situation made the European Commission give a rather blunt comment 
on the success of the reform, as it stated in 2002 that “little substantial 
progress could be reported” (Regular Report 2002, p.28). A year later, 
the Act on civil service undergone major revision: new (more merit-base) 
recruitment procedures were put in place, a new rank of civil servants 
was introduced and formerly political appointees (the prefects) were Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1 
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transformed into career officials; still, recruitment commissions for top 
management positions (high rank civil servants) would have been 
formed out of people nominated by the Prime Minister at the proposal of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration. While the National 
Agency seemed to have consolidated its powers, it remained under the 
political supervision of the Government. At the time, the European 
Commission had already advocated in favor of signing the accession 
treaty, and by 2004, Romania closed all the negotiation chapters. As 
EU’s Monitoring reports (issued in 2005 and 2006) were still quite 
scrupulous in advocating against corruption in the system and more 
transparency in the public administration, by 2006, a peak in civil service 
reform was reached. 
 
2. Unconditional de-forming – seems to have happened as of 2007. One 
could argue that EU continued its monitoring through the CVM reports. 
While fully aware of the role such documents might present for the 
overall image of Romanian reforms, there are two reasons for which I 
consider them of lesser importance for the conditionality argument. First 
refers to the scope of the CVM: in the case of Romania, EU seemed 
interested in how the fight against corruption went within the judicial 
system. Surely, when question on whether there was a rule of law 
present appeared in the summer of 2012, political neutrality became an 
indirect subject of concern. Still, no direct references in that regard were 
being made. Second, what could Romanian politicians lose should EU 
got suddenly upset by their behavior in recruiting civil servants? Such a 
question (and not really its possible answers) made me think twice on 
considering EU’s conditionality present after 2007. Under these limits I 
consider safe to assume that after gaining the EU membership, 
Romania faced no real conditionality in terms of merit-base recruitment 
of civil servants. In such context, the amendments to the Act on civil 
servants that followed suggest an increase in re-politicization - just as 
argued by Andrei et al. (2012), and Iancu and Ungureanu (2010). For 
example, in 2009, former high rank civil servants (as of 2003, the 
prefects) were re-conversed into political appointees; recruitment 
commission were reformed so as to comprise three members from the 
institution where the job opening is present, and only two delegates from 
the National Agency; no unanimity vote was required. And giving that 
with the start of the financial crisis, almost all new public recruitments 
were blocked, it comes as no surprise that no legal substantial changes 
were further reported as of 2009. 
 
If read under the lenses of Table 1, the two reform patterns presented 
above seem to suggest that while EU conditionality was present (1999-
2006), politicization of the civil service (and recruitment procedures) was Innovative Issues and Approaches in Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1 
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at its lowest levels; however, with the conditionality gone (2007-2012), 
politicization re-appeared. That might suggest that the levels of social 
learning effectiveness were quite low, and therefore that the Romanian 
case could belong to the fourth type of Europeanization (low level of 
compliance, reversed changes) – the de-europeanization. 
 
Conclusion 
This article started with defining Europeanization as the incremental 
process of import-export of norms and practices between EU and 
candidate countries, where EU mainly exported norms and candidate 
states (mainly) complied with them. That raised the argument of 
compliance, which led me into assuming a hybrid model of compliance 
which implied that there were four possible types of Europeanization. 
The first one relies on the existence of political conditionality and an 
effective social learning; the second, maintains the conditionality but 
reduces the social learning of candidate / Member States. The third and 
fourth types assume the absence of conditionality, while addressing a 
case of internalized changes (type 3) and one of reversed changes (or 
type 4, de-Europeanization). The Romanian case, a hidden part of the 
EU studies on conditionality and politicization suggested that public 
administration there had experienced a fair trial of reforms during the 
accession period (1999-2006), only to revert to a politicized behavior 
soon after the EU conditionality stopped.  
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